



# Consultation on draft guidelines for determining regional critical contingencies

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## 1. Introduction and purpose

This paper invites interested parties to provide feedback on the draft updated *Guidelines for Determining Regional Critical Contingencies*.

Reg 45(2) of the Gas Governance (Critical Contingency Management) Regulations 2008 requires the industry body (Gas Industry Co) to prepare and publish guidelines to assist the Critical Contingency Operator (CCO) in determining whether a critical contingency event is regional. This distinction is relevant, because the imbalance arrangements do not apply in case of a regional critical contingency (reg 82).

Therefore, defining a regional critical contingency is to ensure that the contingency imbalance arrangements are not operative in circumstances where they are not needed. In some circumstances where it is not immediately clear whether one or both legs of reg 45(1) (which sets out the characteristics of a regional critical contingency) are satisfied, it will help to consider whether contingency imbalance arrangements would assist in managing the critical contingency. If the contingency imbalance arrangements do not appear to help with managing the situation, then that may indicate that it is a regional critical contingency.

## 2. Updated guidelines

The *Guidelines for Determining Regional Critical Contingencies* have not been updated since February 2014. The original document can be found [here](#).

The updated draft guidelines are attached as **appendix A**.

We have generally improved the readability of the document but there is also one material change to the guidelines. In cooperation with the CCO, Gas Industry Co has included a sixth critical contingency scenario to the existing five.

This additional scenario features an evolving scenario, where a regional critical contingency caused by an event develops into a non-regional critical contingency caused by another event. The details of scenario 6 can be found in Appendix A.

We have also updated the network configuration schematics. However, we used the terms "Maui pipeline" or "Firstgas pipeline" to keep the guidelines aligned with the current CCMP wording.

## 3. Regulatory framework

Under reg 45(4) the preparation and publication of revised guidelines by the industry body must follow the process set out in reg 45(3):

- a) prepare a draft set of guidelines that provides scenarios covering the types of events that could arise and for each scenario identifies whether it would be a regional critical contingency; and

- b) publish the draft guidelines for consultation; and
- c) consider submissions on the draft and make any necessary changes to the guidelines.

#### 4. Consultation

Please email your submission to [consultations@gasindustry.co.nz](mailto:consultations@gasindustry.co.nz).

Details of the submissions process are as follows:

1. No email confirmation will be sent out acknowledging receipt of submissions.
2. **Submissions close at 5:00 pm on 30 April 2025.** Please note that submissions received after that time may not be able to be fully considered.
3. All submissions will be published on Gas Industry Co's website after closure date.  
**Submitters should discuss any intended provision of confidential information with Gas Industry Co prior to submitting the information.**

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**1 April 2025**

# Appendix A: Draft guidelines for determining regional critical contingencies



# Guidelines for determining regional critical contingencies

May, 2025



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## Purpose of these guidelines

R45(2) of the Gas Governance (Critical Contingency Management) Regulations 2008 (CCM Regulations) requires the industry body (Gas Industry Co) to prepare and publish guidelines to assist the Critical Contingency Operator (CCO) in determining whether a critical contingency event is regional. This distinction is relevant, because the contingency imbalance arrangements do not apply in the case of a regional critical contingency event (r82).

The CCM Regulations include arrangements for settling "inadvertent trades" among shippers and welded parties (r67-r82). These inadvertent trades occur because the order of curtailment is largely determined by customer size and does not consider whether a customer's supplier has gas available or not.

Two different situations can arise:

1. End-users are curtailed but their supplier had nominated gas to meet their customers' needs, and that gas is still flowing. This situation is described as the supplier being "long" on gas in the system.
2. A gas supplier no longer has access to gas (for example, the production station has failed) but some of the supplier's customers continue to use gas as they are in bands that the CCO has not directed to curtail. This situation is described as the supplier being "short" on gas in the system.

Defining a regional critical contingency is necessary to ensure the contingency imbalance arrangements are not operative in circumstances where they are not required. In circumstances where it is not immediately clear whether one or both legs of r45(1) are satisfied, consider whether contingency imbalance arrangements would assist. If not, then that may indicate that it is a regional critical contingency.

## Contingency imbalance arrangements

A critical contingency arises because demand exceeds supply.

If a supplier long on gas were to fix that situation by reducing its nominations of gas into the system, it would reduce gas supply into the system making the critical contingency worse.

In situations like this, a way to motivate those who are long on gas is needed to encourage them to maintain, or even increase, supply where possible.

The CCM Regulations provide this incentive through provisions for contingency imbalances and the contingency price, providing suppliers who are long on gas with a way to maintain their nominations. After the critical contingency is over, those who are long and/or short on gas (that is, holding positive or negative contingency imbalances) will receive and/or pay money for their contingency imbalances at the contingency price.

Without this incentive, these parties would have no reason to continue supplying gas into the system (as their own customers have been curtailed), which would make a critical contingency worse.

In most critical contingencies, the existence of the contingency imbalance provisions provides the right incentives for parties injecting gas into the transmission system.

## Regional critical contingencies

Contingency imbalance provisions do not serve any useful purpose in managing regional critical contingencies. This is where it is not possible to increase the amount of gas flowing into the affected transmission area.

The Critical Contingency Management (CCM) Regulations define a regional critical contingency (r45(1)) as:

...a critical contingency characterised by—

- (a) a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system; and
- (b) complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply.


The most obvious example is a contingency created when a transmission pipeline has been damaged, the mainline valves surrounding the damaged section have slammed shut, and the portion of the transmission system downstream of the break has no gas coming in.

Under these circumstances, no gas will be coming into the affected section of the pipeline. The contingency imbalance arrangements would have no use, as no producer or shipper could increase the volume of gas in the affected section of pipeline.

## Guideline scenarios

The following six scenarios are intended to provide guidance to the CCO in determining if a regional critical contingency exists in a live critical contingency situation.

# Scenario 1: Maui pipeline damaged north of Mokau compressor



## Features

- The damaged portion of the Maui pipeline is isolated to allow for repairs.

- No gas is being injected into the pipeline north of the isolated section and pressures in that northern section are falling rapidly.
- Given the time needed to effect repairs, extensive curtailment will be required.
- Gas continues to flow in the Maui pipeline south of the isolated section. This means that the valve on the Vector pipeline at Temple View (near Hamilton) that is normally closed could be opened to allow some gas to flow north to Hamilton and Auckland.

## Analysis

### Option 1: the valve at Temple View remains closed

If the valve at Temple View remains closed

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	Yes: the transmission system north of the damage experiences a total loss of supply
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))	Yes

## Conclusion

Scenario 1: Option 1 is a **regional** critical contingency under this option.

### Option 2: the valve at Temple View is open, allowing gas to flow north


By opening the valve at Temple View, gas can flow north to Auckland via the Vector 200 pipeline. This means there is some supply north of the break in the Maui pipeline, but that supply is very limited as the 200 pipeline can supply only a fraction (about 15%) of the normal deliveries from the Maui pipeline.

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	Yes
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))	Yes – the 200 line cannot be considered <b>significant</b> relative to the capacity of the Maui pipeline

## Conclusion

Scenario 1: Option 2 is a **regional** critical contingency under this option as well.

# Scenario 2: Vector North pipeline damaged north of NZ Steel offtake



## Features

- The damage to the North pipeline is located in South Auckland.

- There are no pipelines that bypass the damaged and isolated section.

Due to the small amount of linepack in the north system, very rapid curtailment would be needed to ensure the distribution networks in Auckland and points north did not become depressurised.


## Analysis

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	Yes
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))	Yes

## Conclusion

Scenario 2 is a **regional** critical contingency.

# Scenario 3: Frankley Road pipeline damaged



## Features

- The gas flow from Kupe was northward before the incident (since Kupe's production volumes are larger than the load south of Kupe).
- The entire system would be affected:

- the loss of Kupe gas to points on the Maui pipeline and north would pose a significant loss of supply to those parts of the transmission system
- the transmission system south of the damage would lose supply from Oaonui, Pohokura, and the other production stations north of the break.

It is likely that such a scenario would not lead to a critical contingency, as actions by large consumers and/or MDL's Commercial Operator would be likely to prevent the decline in pressure needed for a critical contingency to be declared.

However, there is still a chance that a scenario like this would result in a critical contingency, so it is useful to consider how it would be classified.

## Analysis

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	No. The entire system would be affected.
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))?	No. Oaonui and Pohokura production stations, as well as smaller fields, would still be able to supply the north part of the transmission system; Kupe and Kapuni can supply the south.


If a critical contingency were declared, it would be helpful for Oaonui, Pohokura and the other production stations north of the break to continue supplying gas, even if their customers were south of the break. Similarly, it would be helpful for Kupe to continue supplying (at least some) gas to the transmission pipeline south of the break, even though its customers might be north of the pipeline break.

Contingency imbalance provisions in this situation would give incentive to the producers (or their contracted customers) to keep supplying gas and would serve as a means to settle the resulting inadvertent trades between producers and/or wholesalers and shippers.

## Conclusion

Scenario 3 is **not** a regional critical contingency.

# Scenario 4: Earthquake affecting gas production



## Features

- A major earthquake has interrupted the supply of Maui and Pohokura gas but the integrity of the transmission system is not affected.

- Gas from Pohokura and Maui accounts for about 60% of receipts into the transmission system. As a result, losing both of those sources would leave a significant shortfall and precipitate a critical contingency.

There are, however, several fields that could continue to produce and supply gas into the transmission system.

## Analysis


Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	No. The entire system would be affected.
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))	No. the transmission system will continue to receive gas into the pipelines.

## Conclusion

Scenario 4 is **not a regional** critical contingency.

This conclusion is consistent with the fact that in such a scenario, the contingency imbalance provisions would serve a useful purpose: the parties with contracts with the remaining fields supplying gas into the system are not necessarily the same set of parties whose customers have not been curtailed. Thus, there will be a need for a system to wash-up the inadvertent trades that will occur.

## Scenario 5: Pipeline damage at Tikorangi



### Features

- Pohokura, Kowhai, Turangi unable to supply gas into the pipeline
- No gas injection north of the break
- South of the break, Oaonui, Kupe, and Kapuni are able to keep operating.

- Demand curtailment would be required in the north
- The transmission system south of the break would also be affected, as it will have lost the supply from Pohokura and other fields, but curtailment probably won't be required.

## Analysis


Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	No. The entire system would be affected.
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))?	No: Oaonui, Kapuni, and Kupe are still able to supply the system south of the pipeline break.

In this situation, it is likely that there would be some consumers south of the pipeline break who normally would receive their gas from Pohokura. Although these customers may not be curtailed in this scenario, their continued consumption would effectively be supplied through producers that they – or their retailers – would not have a contractual relationship with. Therefore, the use of contingency imbalance provisions would be a way of settling these inadvertent trades.

## Conclusion

Scenario 5 is **not a regional** critical contingency.

# Scenario 6: Evolving scenario



## Features

### Stage 1:

- A mechanical failure of the Kaitoke Compressor Station

- This led to a breach of the critical contingency pressure threshold at Waitangirua, near Wellington.

**Stage 2:**

- Sometime later, damage to the electricity supply network resulted in unplanned outages at the Kupe and Oaonui Gas Production Stations. This led to a rapid loss of Maui Pipeline linepack
- The Kapuni Gas Treatment Plant (KGTP) and Rotowaro critical contingency pressure threshold were breached.

**Analysis**

**Stage 1: Failure of Kaitoke Compressor Station**

The failure of the Kaitoke Compressor Station caused a breach of the Waitangirua pressure threshold. This only affected part of the transmission system.

As can be seen from the schematic, there are no pipelines that bypass the damaged and isolated section. As a result, and due to the small amount of linepack in the south system, very rapid curtailment would be needed to ensure the distribution networks in points south of Kaitoke Compressor Station did not become depressurised.

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	Yes
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))?	Yes

**Conclusion**

Scenario 6: Stage 1 is a **regional** critical contingency.

**Stage 2: Unplanned outages at Kupe and Oaonui Gas Production Stations**

When the unplanned outages of the Kupe and Oaonui Gas Production Stations occurred, it resulted in a significant reduction in gas supply to all the transmission system. This led to a breach of the KGTP and Rotowaro pressure thresholds.

Losing gas supply from both Kupe and Maui would leave a significant shortfall and precipitate a critical contingency. There are, however, some fields that could continue to produce and supply gas into the transmission system.

Has there been a substantial reduction to, or total loss of, the supply of gas to a part of the transmission system? (r45(1)(a))	No. The entire system would be affected.
Is there a complete or partial isolation of that part of the transmission system from any significant source of gas supply? (r45(1)(b))?	No, the transmission system will continue to receive gas into the pipelines.

## Conclusion

Scenario 6: Stage 2 is updated from a regional critical contingency to **a non-regional** critical contingency.

In such a developing scenario, the contingency imbalance provisions would serve a useful purpose: the parties with contracts with the remaining fields supplying gas into the system are not necessarily the same set of parties whose customers have not been curtailed. Thus, there would be a need for a system to wash-up the inadvertent trades that would occur.

Price and imbalances provisions do not apply to regional critical contingencies, but they do apply once the critical contingency is upgraded from regional to non-regional.

In this staged scenario r53(1)(h) and r53(1)(h)(ii) are relevant for the CCO's decision to upgrade the critical contingency:

The CCO must consider whether any event has occurred that would revise the critical contingency operator's determination under regulation 52A and, if so, publish a notice stating either—

- (i) that a regional critical contingency has been determined and which parts of the transmission system are subject to the critical contingency determination; or
- (ii) that the critical contingency is no longer a regional critical contingency.

## About Gas Industry Co

Gas Industry Co is the gas industry body and co-regulator under the Gas Act. Its role is to:

- Develop arrangements, including regulations where appropriate, which improve:
  - the operation of gas markets;
  - access to infrastructure; and
  - consumer outcomes;
- Develop these arrangements with the principal objective to ensure that gas is delivered to existing and new customers in a safe, efficient, reliable, fair and environmentally sustainable manner; and
- Oversee compliance with, and review such arrangements.

Gas Industry Co is required to have regard to the Government's policy objectives for the gas sector, and to report on the achievement of those objectives and on the state of the New Zealand gas industry.

**SUBMISSIONS CLOSE:**  
30 April 2025

**SUBMIT TO:**  
[consultations@gasindustry.co.nz](mailto:consultations@gasindustry.co.nz)

**ENQUIRIES:**  
[info@gasindustry.co.nz](mailto:info@gasindustry.co.nz)