# Investment and Access Workshop

**April 2011** 

**Creative Energy Consulting** 

### Consider 4 Questions

- Do we need investment?
- Do we need additional information and tools?
- What commercial incentives are needed?
- What access regime changes are needed?

# Q1: DO WE NEED INVESTMENT?

### Show of Hands

Is immediate investment in new capacity needed on the Northern Pipeline?

A.YES

**B.NO** 

C.DON'T KNOW: need more information

WHY?

# Some possible investment objectives

- Maintain a reliable supply
- Allow end users to obtain the gas they require
- Allow users to obtain the capacity they require
- Promote retail competition
- Make a profitable return on investment capital

# Objectives vs Access Regime

Objective	Contract Carriage	Common Carriage
Reliability	Restrict capacity issuance	KEY OBJECTIVE
Meet end user needs	Through retail market	Through retail market
Meet user needs	KEY OBJECTIVE	Not relevant
Retail Competition	POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE	Not relevant
Profitable Return	Through extra capacity sales	Through tariff increase


## Meet user demand: at what price?

	Cost range (\$m)	Capacity range (TJ/d)	MCE range	
Project			\$/(GJ)	/d)/yr
			Scenario 1	Scenario 2
			(step demand)	(20yr demand ramp)
Partial Looping	80-120	22-32	260-560	580-1200
Full Looping	150-200	140-160	100-150	220-330
Compression	19-49	9-12	160-560	350-1200

Current Auckland zone tariff is \$60/(GJ/day)/yr

Figures taken from Vector presentation, North Pipeline: Winter 2010 (and Beyond), March 2010.

# Pricing Issue



## Quick Summary

- To answer question "is investment needed?", you first need to define your investment objectives
- These depend upon the access regime:
  - Contract carriage: provide new capacity to users prepared to pay for it
  - Common carriage: maintain supply reliability
- And the access regime will determine who should pay:
  - Contract carriage: incremental users
  - Common carriage: all users


# Q2: DO WE NEED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND TOOLS?

### Back to Show of Hands

To those that answered "DON'T KNOW":

what additional information do you need to make up your mind?

## Investment Process Blueprint




# Transpower Presentation


### Discussion

- What information and tools are required?
- Where do they fit into the blueprint?
- How is this done in Australia? Electricity? Other?
- Who should be responsible: owner, operator, GIC, CC, MED, users or other?
- Who should specify and direct the process: CC, GIC, users?
- Design and Implementation issues arising?

# Australian Gas SOO Example



### Australian Gas Bulletin Board



# Australian Short-term Trading Market

TTM GAS PRICE	* & QUANTITY		ı	
Hub/Date	Ex Ante Price	Ex Ante Quantity	Ex Post Price	Ex Post Quantity
Adelaide				
11 Apr 2011	\$3.76/GJ	72 TJ	\$3.94/GJ	77 TJ
12 Apr 2011	\$3.75/GJ	72 TJ	0.40	-
13 Apr 2011	\$3.73/GJ	70 TJ	-	-
Sydney				
11 Apr 2011	\$3.28/GJ	267 TJ	\$3.81/GJ	272 TJ
12 Apr 2011	\$3.52/GJ	272 TJ	-	-
13 Apr 2011	\$3.50/GJ	279 TJ	-	-

# Q3: WHAT COMMERCIAL INCENTIVES ARE NEEDED?

### Back to Show of Hands

To those that answered "YES":

Why do you think investment is not happening?

## Current CC Timeline (approx)

Commissioned	DPP	СРР
To 2011 [?]	2012	2012
2012-2014	2017	2014
2014-2016	2017	Year in service

Note: under average price cap, incremental sales earn incremental revenue at tariff

#### **Assume:**

DPP runs 2012-2017
CPP runs 2014-2017
Cut off for inclusion in DPP is 2011

### **Investment Drivers**

- Carrot: profitable return on investment
- Stick: regulatory penalties for not achieving investment objectives
- Market Power: impact of investment on existing commercial positions
- Current Uncertainty: wait for more CC regime to be clarified
- Future Uncertainty: in demand or regulated return

# Uncertainties for Regulated Investor

WACC vs Funding Cost Regulatory Approval (Roll-in)

Demand across
Pipeline
Network

Future Regulatory Optimisation

# Uncertainties for Unregulated Investor

**Funding Cost** 

Demand on Pipeline

Competing Pipeline

Interconnection

#### Fundamental Issues

#### Issue

- Wait for new CC regime to be established
- WACC is a blunt tool: encourages too much or too little investment
- "Price-quality" is a common carriage concept

#### **Possible Solution**

- Establish special vehicle for urgent investment
- Need to define "prudent investments" which WACC is payable on
- Align the ER and AA regimes

## **Discussion Options**

- Access regime changes:
  - Through VTC change
  - through GIC regulation
- Economic Regulation changes:
  - Through input to CC process
  - In parallel with CC process
- Unregulated investment
  - By Vector
  - By third party

# Q4: WHAT ACCESS REGIME CHANGES ARE NEEDED?

## High-level View


- Even with efficient investment, there will be times of capacity scarcity. With underinvestment, it will be more frequent
- Access to scarce transmission capacity under contract carriage has similarities to production capacity:
  - If you want some, talk to existing capacity holders
  - If they won't let you have any, go out and procure your own
- But reform of production access is not being contemplated
- So, what are the essential differences between production and transmission capacity that might mean that transmission reform is required?

#### Production vs Transmission

#### **Production**

- Large end users buy from wholesale market under longterm contracts
- New entrant can build own capacity
- No automatic access to tariffed capacity
- Common carriage access not feasible in competitive sector

#### **Transmission**



- New entrant must persuade Vector to build capacity
  - Access to tariffed capacity until recently: market has not yet adapted to recent shortage
  - Common carriage is feasible in a natural monopoly



## Discussion: Strategic Options

- 1. Move to common carriage access
- 2. Make contract carriage transmission work more like "contract carriage" production (albeit recognising the natural monopoly in the former), addressing:
  - Large customer churn
  - Investment efficiency
  - Secondary trading
- 3. Ensure that there is always sufficient spare capacity to support retail competition under contract carriage
  - Deliberately overinvest
  - Discourage hoarding by users or Vector
  - Improve the churn process to minimise required spare capacity