

GAS TRANSMISSION ACCESS

SINGLE CODE OPTIONS PAPER – PART 1 (SCOP1)

DATE:


20 September 2016

AUTHOR:

Ian Wilson



More 'granularity' on timeline



GIC role

- Access arrangements can have a major impact on competition in upstream (production) and downstream (retail) sectors
- As 'industry body' under the Gas Act, GIC will ultimately assess new access arrangements to determine if any regulations should be recommended to the Minister
- Accordingly, GIC has agreed to co-lead the new code development work with First Gas, each with its complementary role
- GIC will be careful at each stage not to compromise its independence

Proposed regulatory objective



To promptly establish a new non-discriminatory gas transmission open access regime to replace the MPOC and VTC that facilitates:

1. efficient operation of the transmission system and use of pipeline capacity;
 2. competition in upstream and downstream markets; and
 3. efficient investment in pipelines.
- Ultimately new access arrangements will be assessed against the Gas Act and GPS objectives, but the regulatory objective summarises what GIC is looking for

Components of new access arrangements

- A new access regime will need to address substantially the same matters dealt with by the current regime
- GIC is open-minded on which matters will be covered in:
 - A single new code
 - Other contracts
 - Regulations
 - Operating procedures
- But helpful to look at scope of existing codes

The existing codes



Comparison of MPOC and VTC (1)

- Both codes cover:
 - 'boilerplate' (prudentials, FM, assignment etc)
 - Services
 - Information availability
 - Gas specification
 - Dispute resolution
 - Code amendments
 - Pro-forma contracts (TSAs and, for MPOC also ICAs)

Comparison of MPOC and VTC (2)

- Each code somewhat differently covers:
 - Technical standards
 - Notification of quantities (AQs and reservations)
 - Nominations
 - Balancing
 - Determination of receipts and deliveries
 - Fees
 - Confidentiality

Comparison of MPOC and VTC (3)

- Only MPOC covers:
 - Scheduled quantities
 - Incentives pool
 - Pipeline maintenance
 - Interconnection contracts
 - Details of welded points
 - Operating pressures
 - Peaking and tolerances on nominations
 - Shipper and Welded Party principles
 - Tariff principles
- Only VTC covers:
 - Odourisation

Starting point – service definitions

- At the highest level, is the core service:
 - point to point
 - zonal
 - entry–exit
 - common carriage
 - other
- How is each service:
 - defined (eg a preferential right to capacity, or interruptible capacity)
 - priced (eg by cost allocation or at a market price)
 - allocated if scarce (eg on a first-come-first-served basis, in proportion to historic use, or by auction)

PEA work may help

- For example, the July 2012 advice paper considered:
 - International comparison (Appendix A) looking at:
 - capacity products
 - capacity allocation among pipeline users
 - contractual congestion management
 - physical congestion management
 - encouraging efficient pipeline investment
 - vertical separation
 - market transparency
 - Lessons from other jurisdictions (Chapter 3)
 - A strawman proposal (Chapter 5)
- And, the July 2013 advice paper set out guiding principles

PEA suggested lessons from overseas

- Capacity product definitions
 - Approaches reflect characteristics of each system and policy objectives of regulators: point to point for US, entry/exit for EU
- Capacity allocation among pipeline users
 - Increasing use of auctions to allocate capacity when demand > supply
- Transparency
 - Tendency for improved transparency over time. In US, there is now effectively no confidential information relating to pipeline access
- Contractual congestion management
 - Significant concerns about un-used capacity but no 'silver bullet' to settle the issue. EU promotes a combination of transparency, 'use it or lose it' access rights, and secondary markets

PEA suggested lessons from overseas

- Physical congestion management
 - Maximum utilisation of the pipeline usually achieved by use of interruptible contracts, accounting for 10 to 15% of deliveries in US
- Vertical separation
 - Generally mandated overseas

Summary of proposed synthesis of the PEA's guiding principles (1)

A new transmission access regime should ideally:

- Provide firm and non-firm rights. Firm rights to be:
 - tradeable
 - allocated on a willingness to pay basis when scarce

Summary of proposed synthesis of the PEA's guiding principles (2)

A new transmission access regime should ideally:

- Provide full disclosure of:
 - terms and conditions of services
 - the amount of firm and non-firm service offered
 - the physical capacity of the system
 - the proportion of available capacity offered as firm service
 - any programme for the progressive release of capacity
 - the basis on which non-standard arrangements may be negotiated
 - non-standard agreements
 - all information relevant to the formation of prices

Summary of proposed synthesis of the PEA's guiding principles (3)

A new transmission access regime should ideally:

- Include a nominations regime with incentives for parties to give accurate nominations
- Move away from grandfathering arrangements
- Provide price signals to indicate scarcity where possible
- Allocate any congestion rents in a way that minimises distortions to long-term bidding for firm capacity and short-term incentives.
- Recover the costs of making information transparent, and establishing a single access regime, from a broad base.
- Be supported by efficient governance arrangements.

Submissions

- We welcome any feedback, but have specifically asked if you:
 - agree with the proposed regulatory objective?
 - agree that it is not necessary to specify what elements of the access regime will be addressed in a new code at this stage of the process?
 - agree with the suggested synthesis of the PEA's guiding principles?
 - agree with the suggested initial scope of the options?
 - consider that the process outlined above is appropriate?